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Abstract
This paper assesses how various approaches to modeling the separation margin af-
fect the quantitative ability of the Mortensen-Pissarides labor matching model. The
model with a constant separation rate fails to produce realistic volatility and produc-
tivity responsiveness of the separation rate and worker ﬂows. The speciﬁcation with
endogenous separation succeeds along these dimensions. Allowing for on-the-job search
enables the model to replicate the Beveridge curve. All speciﬁcations, however, fail to
generate suﬃcient volatility of the job ﬁnding rate. While adopting the Hagedorn-
Manovskii calibration remedies this problem, the volume of job-to-job transitions in
the on-the-job search speciﬁcation becomes essentially zero.
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11 Introduction
In its complete form, the Mortensen-Pissarides job matching model (henceforth MP model)
endogenously determines both the match creation and separation margins.1 While re-
searchers agree that match creation is appropriately viewed as endogenous, there is little
consensus as to the proper treatment of the separation margin. In this paper, we assess
how these various approaches to modeling the separation margin aﬀect the ability of the MP
model to explain key facts about unemployment, transition rates, worker ﬂows and other
variables.
For this purpose, we use textbook job matching models exposited by Pissarides (2000)
that diﬀer only with respect to how the separation margin is modeled. Speciﬁcally, match
separation is parameterized in three ways: (i) exogenous (and constant) separation rate; (ii)
endogenous separation into unemployment; and (iii) endogenous separation with on-the-job
search (OJS).2 This approach allows us to examine transparently the role of the separation
margin in a uniﬁed framework. Furthermore, our evaluation of the model considers the full
dynamic stochastic equilibrium, solved for via a nonlinear method.
We calibrate the model following the standard practice used in the literature.3 Statis-
tics calculated from simulated data for the three speciﬁcations are then compared to cor-
responding statistics from the empirical data, including transition rates and worker ﬂows,
constructed by Fujita and Ramey (2006). The results show, ﬁrst of all, that the model with
a constant separation rate fares poorly in accounting for the volatility of key labor market
variables. It does not, of course, explain the substantial variability of the separation rate
observed in the data, nor does it generate anywhere near the empirical volatility of unem-
ployment.4 In addition, the cyclical behavior of gross worker ﬂows in this version of the
model is clearly counterfactual: in the data, both unemployment-to-employment (UE) and
employment-to-unemployment (EU) worker ﬂows are countercyclical, whereas they are both
procyclical in the model. This counterfactual implication arises due to the omission of the
cyclical variations of the separation rate.
On the other hand, the two speciﬁcations with endogenous determination of separation
rates each generate substantially greater volatility of unemployment and worker ﬂows.5 In
the model with OJS, for example, the standard deviation of unemployment equals 60 per-
cent of its empirical value. Moreover, the three speciﬁcations match closely the standard
deviations of UE and EU ﬂows. Introducing realistic variability at the separation margin
1Throughout this paper, the terms “separation” and “job ﬁnding” denote movements of workers between
employment and unemployment.
2In the earlier version of this paper (Fujita and Ramey (2011)) we also consider a case in which separation
rates are determined by an exogenous stochastic process.
3In particular, the ﬂow value of unemployment, which is known to be crucial for equilibrium volatility, is
set to 70 percent of average output.
4The latter point has been stressed by Shimer (2005) and Costain and Reiter (2008).
5Note that these three speciﬁcations are calibrated to match the empirical volatility of the separation
rate, so the paper does not directly assess the performance of the model along this dimension. However,
there are numerous statistical relationships between the separation rate and other variables that are not
used for calibration, and these are available for model evaluation.
2thus substantially improves the performance of the model in accounting for unemployment
and worker ﬂow variability.
In the data, the separation rate and the two worker ﬂow variables exhibit substantial neg-
ative correlations with productivity. The exogenous separation speciﬁcation fails to replicate
this pattern. The two versions with endogenous separation, however, exhibit realistic respon-
siveness of these variables to productivity. Thus endogeneity of the separation rate appears
central to explaining the cyclical properties of the separation rate and worker ﬂows.
The two endogenous separation speciﬁcations diﬀer in their ability to account for the
Beveridge curve relationship, wherein unemployment and vacancies display a strong neg-
ative correlation. In the absence of OJS, the model produces a counterfactually positive
unemployment-vacancy correlation, due to the “echo” eﬀect that higher unemployment dur-
ing downturns makes it easier to ﬁnd workers, stimulating vacancy posting. With OJS, how-
ever, downturns also imply a fall in the number of employed searchers, militating against
the rise in unemployment. The unemployment-vacancy correlation becomes strongly nega-
tive in this case, matching closely the empirical value. Endogenous separation is therefore
consistent with the Beveridge curve relationship when OJS is added to the model.
In summary, the endogenous separation speciﬁcation with OJS implies empirically rea-
sonable volatility and productivity responsiveness of unemployment, the separation rate and
worker ﬂows, together with realistic Beveridge curve and transition rate correlations. Each
of the remaining three speciﬁcations fails decisively along one or more of these dimensions.
This provides strong support for the OJS model as the most valid speciﬁcation.
The results also show, however, that the MP model under the standard calibration does
not produce realistic volatility of the job ﬁnding rate, irrespective of how the separation
margin is modeled. The empirical standard deviation of the job ﬁnding rate is nearly ﬁve
times the simulated value for each of the three speciﬁcations, and the comparison is similar
for the productivity elasticity. The two speciﬁcations without OJS also deliver an insuﬃcient
productivity responsiveness of market tightness (i.e., the vacancy-unemployment ratio). In
the OJS speciﬁcation, however, market tightness is more responsive to productivity, with
a productivity elasticity equal to roughly 50 percent of the empirical value. In the OJS
speciﬁcation, the substantial variation in the unemployment rate, together with vacancies
that are negatively correlated with unemployment, lead market tightness to be relatively
responsive to productivity.
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) propose an alternative calibration strategy, drawing on
empirical information on wages and proﬁts, which raises the volatility of unemployment,
market tightness and other variables in the exogenous separation version of the MP model.
To investigate the robustness of the above ﬁndings to this alternative, the exogenous sepa-
ration and OJS versions are suitably recalibrated. In line with Hagedorn and Manovskii’s
ﬁndings, this procedure yields much more realistic volatility of unemployment, the job ﬁnd-
ing rate, vacancies and market tightness. It does not, however, remedy the key failings of
the model with a constant separation rate; in particular, the separation rate and worker
ﬂows continue to display unrealistic variability and productivity comovement. Moreover, in
the OJS speciﬁcation, the volume of job-to-job transitions becomes essentially zero. This is
3because the worker’s bargaining weight is very low under the alternative calibration, making
OJS unattractive in nearly all circumstances.
The previous literature contains numerous papers that evaluate dynamic stochastic equi-
libria of various versions of the MP model.6 Notably, Mortensen (1994) carries out a
calibration-simulation analysis of an OJS speciﬁcation in continuous time, and stresses the
model’s ability to explain facts about job creation and destruction in manufacturing. That
paper also shows that the model delivers countercyclical worker ﬂows and a negative Bev-
eridge correlation, consistent with the results obtained in the current paper.
Several previous papers have analyzed business cycle properties of the MP model by
means of comparative statics analysis of steady states.7 In particular, Mortensen and
Nagyp´ al (2007b) and Mortensen and Nagyp´ al (2007a) may be viewed as a uniﬁed treat-
ment of the exogenous and endogenous separation speciﬁcations, respectively, within the
steady-state paradigm. The former paper allows the separation rate to be either constant or
exogenously time-varying, and argues that unemployment volatility is increased in the time-
varying case. The latter paper stresses that the eﬀects of endogenous separation depend on
how match-speciﬁc productivity varies with match duration.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the three speciﬁcations of the MP
model and constructs theoretical measures that correspond to the empirical data series. The
calibration procedure and numerical solution method are discussed in Section 3, and results
are presented in Section 4. In Section 5, the dynamic interrelationships between labor market
variables are considered. Section 6 investigates the implications of the Hagedorn-Manovskii
calibration approach, and Section 7 concludes.
2 MP Model
There is a unit mass of atomistic workers and an inﬁnite mass of atomistic ﬁrms. Time
periods are weekly. In any week t, a worker may be either matched with a ﬁrm or unemployed,
while a ﬁrm may be matched with a worker, unmatched and posting a vacancy, or inactive.
Unemployed workers receive a ﬂow beneﬁt of b per week, representing the total value of
leisure, home production and unemployment insurance payments. Firms that post vacancies
pay a posting cost of c per week. Let ut and vt denote the number of unemployed workers and
posted vacancies, respectively, in week t. In the case of no OJS, the number of new matches
formed in week t is determined by a matching function m(ut,vt), having a Cobb-Douglas:
6Dynamic stochastic equilibria of the MP model with a constant separation rate are evaluated in Merz
(1995), Andolfatto (1996), Hall (2005), Nason and Slotsve (2005), Shimer (2005), Yashiv (2006), Fujita
and Ramey (2007), Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and Shimer (2010); Mortensen and Pissarides (1994),
Cooley and Quadrini (1999), Cole and Rogerson (1999), Den Haan et al. (2000), and Walsh (2005) analyze
dynamic stochastic equilibria of speciﬁcations with an endogenous separation rate, while OJS is assessed in
Mortensen (1994), Pissarides (1994), Krause and Lubik (2006), Nagyp´ al (2005) and Tasci (2006). Recently,
Menzio and Shi (2011) analyze unemployment and worker transitions using an OJS model that uses an
alternative “directed search” approach.
7See Hornstein et al. (2005), Shimer (2005), Mortensen and Nagyp´ al (2007b), Mortensen and Nagyp´ al







Thus, an unemployed worker’s probability of obtaining a match in week t, denoted by f(θt),
equals Aθ
1−α
t , where the variable θt = vt/ut indicates market tightness. The job ﬁlling rate
for a vacancy, denoted by q(θt), equals Aθ
−α
t . The value of vt in each week is determined by
free entry.
A worker-ﬁrm match can produce an output level of ztx during week t, where zt and x
are aggregate and match-speciﬁc productivity factors, respectively. The aggregate factor is
determined according to the following exogenous process:




t is an i.i.d. normal disturbance with mean zero and standard deviation σz. Deter-
mination of x is discussed below.
Before engaging in production in week t, the worker and ﬁrm negotiate a contract that
divides match surplus according to the Nash bargaining solution, where π gives the worker’s
bargaining weight and the disagreement point is severance of the match. Let St(x) indicate
the value of match surplus in week t for given x, and let Ut and Vt be the values received
by an unemployed worker and a vacancy-posting ﬁrm, respectively. The worker and ﬁrm
will agree to continue the match if St(x) > 0, while they will separate if separation is jointly
optimal, in which case St(x) = 0. As the outcome of bargaining, the worker and ﬁrm receive
payoﬀs of πSt(x) + Ut and (1 − π)St(x) + Vt, respectively. Let xh denote the value of the
match-speciﬁc productivity in a new match. The unemployment value satisﬁes:






where Et represents the expectation operator with respect to the aggregate state in t and β
is the discount factor. The value of posting a vacancy is written as:






In free entry equilibrium, Vt = 0 for all t, implying that:
βq(θt)(1 − π)EtSt+1(x
h) = c. (4)
This condition determines θt in every period.
2.1 Exogenous Separation
In the exogenous separation version of the MP model, x = xh is assumed to hold at all times
and for all matches. At the end of each week, matches face a risk of exogenous separation.
The probability that any existing match separates at the end of week t is given by s.
Let Mt(x) denote the value of a match in week t when the match-speciﬁc factor is x.
5Since the worker and ﬁrm seek to maximize match value as part of Nash bargaining, Mt(xh)




















h) + s(Ut+1 + Vt+1)
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.
Match surplus then can be expressed as:
St(x
h) = Mt(x










t(x) represents match surplus when continuation is chosen. Substituting for Ut from





h − b + β
￿




Equations (4) and (5) determine the equilibrium paths of θt and St(xh) for given realizations
of the zt process.
2.2 Endogenous Separation
In the endogenous separation version (without OJS), x follows a Markov process. All new
matches start at x = xh, but the value of x may switch in subsequent weeks. At the end of
each week t, a switch occurs with probability λ. In the latter event, the value of x for week
t+ 1 is drawn randomly according to the c.d.f. G(x), taken to be truncated lognormal with
parameters µx and σx for x < xh, and G(xh) = 1. With probability 1 − λ, x maintains its
week t value into week t + 1.8








t (x) again represents the value of the match when continuation of the match is
chosen, and is expressed as follows:
M
c







Mt+1(y)dG(y)+ (1 − λ)Mt+1(x)
!
+ s(Ut+1 + Vt+1)
#
,
8The literature sometimes assumes that match-speciﬁc productivity follows an i.i.d. process (e.g.,
Den Haan et al. (2000) and Krause and Lubik (2007)). However, the degree of persistence is not an in-
nocuous consideration with respect to the cyclicality of the aggregate separation rate. As discussed below,
the parameter λ is calibrated by matching the persistence of the aggregate separation rate.
6Note that s captures an exogenous component of the separation rate. The Bellman equation









t(x) represents the value of match surplus after continuation of the match is chosen:
S
c













Equations (4) and (6) determine the equilibrium paths of θt and St(x) for given realizations
of the zt process.
2.3 OJS
The OJS version of the MP model extends the endogenous separation version by allowing
matched workers to search at a cost of a. The worker search pool expands to ut +φt, where
φt indicates the number of matched workers who search in week t. Total match formation
in week t is now equal to m(ut + φt,vt). The expressions for matching probabilities stay
the same as before, with a suitable redeﬁnition of the market tightness variable; that is,
θt ≡ vt/(ut + φt).
When an employed searching worker makes a new match in week t, the worker must
renounce the option of keeping his current job before bargaining with the new ﬁrm at the
start of week t+1. As a consequence, the worker receives a payoﬀ of πSt+1(xh)+Ut+1 from
the new match. Since the worker’s payoﬀ from the current job cannot exceed this value, it
is optimal for the worker always to accept a new match.9











t (x) and Mcs
t (x)represent the value of continuation of the match with no OJS and
with OJS, respectively. These two terms are expressed as follows:
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cn







Mt+1(y)dG(y) + (1 − λ)Mt+1(x)
!
+ s(Ut+1 + Vt+1)
#
,
9The assumption that all new matches start at the highest productivity level greatly simpliﬁes the analysis
of OJS, in that it implies all job oﬀers are accepted (see Mortensen (1994) and Pissarides (2000)). Without
it, solving for dynamic stochastic equilibria may require more explicit consideration of the distribution of
match productivities. Moreover, the assumption leads to counterfactual implications concerning how wages
and separation rates depend on match duration. Examining the micro- and macro-level implications of this
modeling issue is beyond the scope of the paper. See Mortensen and Nagyp´ al (2007a) for analysis of the
issue within the steady-state paradigm.
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Mt+1(y)dG(y) + (1 − λ)Mt+1(x)
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.
Assuming that the worker’s search decision is contractible, the Bellman equation for











t (x) and Scn
t (x) represent match surplus with and without OJS. Using the equation
for Ut and setting Vt = 0, these two terms may be expressed as:
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Equilibrium θt and St(x) are determined by (4) and (7) in this case.
2.4 Measurement
Equilibrium worker transition rates and ﬂows are measured as follows. A worker who is
unemployed in week t becomes employed in week t + 1 with probability f(θt) = Aθ
1−α
t .
Thus, for all speciﬁcations the measured job ﬁnding rate and number of UE ﬂows for week
t + 1 are
JFRt+1 = Aθ
1−α
t , UEt+1 = Aθ
1−α
t ut.
Moreover, in the speciﬁcation with a constant separation rate, a worker who is employed in
week t becomes unemployed in week t+ 1 with probability s, giving the following measured
separation rate and the number of EU ﬂows:
SRt+1 = s, EUt+1 = s(1 − ut).
The latter equation shows that EU (separation) ﬂows in the model with a constant separation
rate vary procyclically, insofar as unemployment moves countercyclically. We show below
that this is counterfactual.
Separation rates and EU ﬂows in the two endogenous separation versions of the model
depend on the distribution of x across existing matches. Let et(x) denote the number of
matches in week t having match-speciﬁc factors less than or equal to x; note that et(xh) gives
8total employment. Since St(x) is strictly increasing in x wherever St(x) > 0, there exists a
value Rt such that St(x) = 0 if and only if x ≤ Rt. Thus, separation into unemployment
occurs at the start of week t + 1 whenever x ≤ Rt+1.10 In equilibrium, et+1(x) = 0 for
x ≤ Rt+1. The employment distribution diﬀers depending on whether or not OJS is allowed.
Endogenous separation without OJS. In the absence of OJS, the employment distri-
bution evolves according to:












for x ∈ (Rt+1,xh). For x = xh, it evolves according to:
et+1(x













which gives the evolution of the stock of employment. Next, total EU ﬂows and the separation
rate are, respectively, given by:
EUt+1 = set(x
h) + (1 − s)
￿
λG(Rt+1)et(x







The implied law of motion for unemployment is:
ut+1 = ut + EUt+1 − UEt+1. (13)
Lastly, vacancies are determined simply by:
vt = θtut.
Endogenous separation with OJS. Allowing for the possibility of OJS somewhat com-
plicates the evolution of labor market variables. First, it can be shown that there exists
a value Rs
t such that the match surplus from OJS exceeds the surplus from continuing the
match with no OJS if and only if x < Rs
t. In other words, OJS is chosen whenever Rt < Rs
t
and x ∈ (Rt,Rs
t) . Therefore, for x ∈ (Rt,Rs
t):


















10When x = Rt+1, the ﬁrm and worker could also choose to continue their match, as a matter of indif-
ference. It is slightly more convenient for notational purposes to specify that separation occurs at the Rt+1
margin.
9while, for x ∈ [Rs
t,xh):






















In essence, the presence of OJS alters the evolution of the employment distribution in that
OJS makes it possible for those on-the-job searchers to avoid endogenous separation into
unemployment (when the search is successful) given that their match-speciﬁc factor starts
at the highest level xh in the following period. The law of motion for the total employment
stock is written as:
et+1(x






















+ f(θt)(ut + et(R
s
t)). (14)
Note that (14) diﬀers from the corresponding equation for the version without OJS (equation
(10)), even though job-to-job transitions simply reshuﬄe workers within the employment
pool. This property comes from the fact that when on-the-job searchers ﬁnd a new job,
they essentially avoid endogenous separation into unemployment. Accordingly, EU ﬂows are
measured diﬀerently in the model with OJS, relative to those in the model without OJS:
EUt+1 =set(x











+ (1 − λ)(1 − f(θt))et(Rt+1)
￿
. (15)
The expressions for the separation rate and the law of motion for unemployment remain the
same as (12) and (13), respectively. Lastly, vacancies are determined by:




Before examining the quantitative properties of the diﬀerent versions discussed above, this
section presents the calibration procedure. We then lay out the method to compute the
stochastic dynamic equilibrium of the model and summarize the procedure to evaluate var-
ious quantitative aspects of the model.
3.1 Calibration
There are three speciﬁcations of the model to calibrate. Parameter choices for the these
three cases are given in Table 1.
10The parameters b, α and π are set to the standard values, as discussed by Mortensen and
Nagyp´ al (2007b). First, the ﬂow value of unemployment is set to 0.7, which amounts to 70
percent of average output per worker, given that productivity is normalized to unity. We will
later consider the calibration proposed by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), in which b is set
to a higher value. The elasticity parameter of the matching function α and the bargaining
weight of workers π are both set to 0.7. This is close to the values of a and π (0.72) used
in Shimer (2005). Mortensen and Nagyp´ al (2007b) argue that 0.72 is empirically too high
and estimate it at 0.45. However, a more recent paper by Br¨ ugemann (2008) reconciles the
two estimates and proposes estimates between 0.54 and 0.63. In this paper, we use the value
originally estimated by Shimer (2005) as a benchmark value and then later examine the
robustness of our results when the alternative values α = π = 0.5 are used.
Calibration of the vacancy posting cost c draws on survey evidence on employer recruit-
ment behavior. Survey results cited in Barron et al. (1997) point to an average vacancy
duration of roughly three weeks. Moreover, Barron and Bishop (1985) ﬁnd an average of
about nine applicants for each vacancy ﬁlled, with two hours of work time required to pro-
cess each application. These ﬁgures suggest an average investment of 20 hours per vacancy
ﬁlled, or 6.7 hours per week the vacancy is posted. This amounts to 17 percent of a 40-hour
workweek; thus, it is reasonable to assign this value to c, given that weekly productivity is
normalized to unity.
Next, to ensure comparability across diﬀerent versions of the model, the highest value
of match-speciﬁc productivity xh is adjusted to generate mean match productivity of unity
in all cases. The cost of searching on the job a in the OJS speciﬁcation is chosen so that
the mean monthly job-to-job transition rate in the simulated data matches the value of 3.2
percent calculated by Moscarini and Thompson (2007) using the CPS data.
The parameters for the aggregate productivity process ρz and σz are set to the values
proposed by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).11 The value of the weekly discount factor β
is consistent with an annual interest rate of four percent.
Selection of the remaining parameters relies on monthly job ﬁnding and separation rate
data from Fujita and Ramey (2006). These data derive from the CPS for the 1976-2005
period and are adjusted for margin error and time aggregation error. In all cases, the
parameters A and s are chosen to ensure that the simulated data generate mean monthly
job ﬁnding and separation rates of 34 percent and two percent, respectively, consistent with
the Fujita-Ramey evidence.
For endogenous separation versions of the model, the arrival rate of the match-speciﬁc
productivity shock λ and its standard deviation σx are selected to match the standard
deviation and ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of the simulated separation rate series, aggregated
to quarterly, logged and HP ﬁltered (with smoothing parameter 1,600), to the empirical
values of these moments in the Fujita-Ramey data. More speciﬁcally, σx is used to achieve
the standard deviation of the cyclical component of the empirical separation rate series. We
11In the earlier version of the paper (Fujita and Ramey (2011)), we set these two parameters based on
the VAR evidence in Fujita and Ramey (2007), in which case these two parameters are set to 0.99 and
0.027, respectively, instead of the values in Table 1. We ﬁnd that the results are robust with respect to this
alternative calibration.
11Table 1: Parameter Values for Benchmark Calibration
Parameter Constant
Endogenous Endogenous
without OJS with OJS
b 0.7 0.7 0.7
c 0.17 0.17 0.17
a − − 0.13
A 0.095 0.094 0.096
α 0.7 0.7 0.7
π 0.7 0.7 0.7
xh 1 1.15 1.1
s 0.005 0.0034 0.0042
λ − 0.085 0.085
σx − 0.16 0.214
ρz 0.9895 0.9895 0.9895
σz 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034
β 0.9992 0.9992 0.9992
Notes. b: unemployment payoﬀ; c: vacancy posting cost; a: OJS
cost; A: scale parameter of the matching function; α: elasticity
parameter of the matching function; π: worker bargaining weight;
xh: highest value of match-speciﬁc productivity; s: exogenous
separation rate; λ: arrival rate of the match-speciﬁc productiv-
ity shock; σx: S.D. of the match-speciﬁc productivity shock; ρz:
persistence of the aggregate productivity process; σz: S.D. of the
aggregate productivity shock; β: discount factor.
adjust λ to match the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient of the series. The chosen value
0.085 implies a mean waiting time of three months between switches of the match-speciﬁc
productivity factor. The persistence of the separation rate is useful in identifying the arrival
rate, in that more (less) frequent arrival of the shock tends to raise (lower) the persistence.
We discuss the intuition behind this property of the model in Section 5, where we examine
alternative parameterizations.
3.2 Solution Method
The model consists of the free entry condition (4), the surplus equation (5), (6) or (7), and
the driving process (1). To solve the model, let the stochastic elements be represented on
grids. The method of Tauchen (1986) is used to represent the process zt as a Markov chain
having a state space {z1,...,zI} and the transition matrix ∆z = [δz
ij], where δz
ij = Pr{zt+1 =
zj|zt = zi}. G(x) is approximated by a discrete distribution with support {x1,...,xM},
satisfying x1 = 1/M, xm − xm−1 = xh/M and xM = xh. The associated probabilities
{γ1,...,γM} are γm = g(xm)/M for m = 1,...,M − 1, where g(x) is the lognormal density,
12and γM = 1 − γ1 − ... − γM−1. Market tightness and match surplus may be represented as:
θt = θ(zi), St(xm) = S(zi,xm),
where zi is the aggregate state prevailing in period t. Equations (4), (5) and (6) take the

















































and similarly for (7). Numerical solutions are obtained via backward substitution. For
example, let θT(zi) and ST(zi,xh) be the functions obtained after T iterations of (16) and
































Convergence follows as a consequence of the saddlepoint stability property of the matching
model, which makes for stability in the backward dynamics.12
3.3 Evaluation Procedure
The empirical data series used for purposes of model evaluation are constructed as follows.
Job ﬁnding and separation rates, and UE and EU ﬂows, are quarterly averages of the monthly
series from Fujita and Ramey (2006), covering 1976Q1-2005Q4. Employment and the un-
employment rate are quarterly averages of the CPS oﬃcial monthly series covering the same
period. The productivity series is obtained by dividing quarterly GDP by the employment
series in the CPS. Vacancies are measured as quarterly averages of the monthly composite
Help-Wanted index constructed by Barnichon (2010). All quarterly series are logged and HP
12In solving the model, I = 13 and M = 200 are chosen. The tolerance for point-wise convergence of θ(zi)
and S(zi,xm) is 10−8.
13ﬁltered, with a smoothing parameter of 1,600.
To conform with the empirical series, the weekly data from the model are averaged
to quarterly frequency, logged and HP ﬁltered using smoothing parameter 1,600. Each
simulated quarterly series consists of 320 observations, of which the last 120 are used to
calculate the reported statistics. For each of the three speciﬁcations, 1,000 replications are
run and averages of the statistics across the replications are presented.
4 Main Results
This section discusses the main results of the paper. Table 2 presents various second moment
properties of the three speciﬁcations of the MP model as well as those of the observed
data. In each panel of the table, we present the standard deviation, the elasticity with
respect to labor productivity, the correlation coeﬃcient with labor productivity, and the
autocorrelation coeﬃcient for the seven variables listed across the ﬁrst row of the table.
Later, we also consider cross correlations between unemployment and vacancies, i.e., the
Beveridge correlations, and between the separation rate and the job ﬁnding rate.
4.1 Unemployment and Worker Transition Rates
The ﬁrst three columns of Table 2 compare the empirical moments of unemployment and
worker transition rates with the values obtained from the three speciﬁcations of the model.
The empirical standard deviation of unemployment, equalling 9.6 percent, is roughly nine
times greater than the value of 1.1 percent generated by the exogenous separation speciﬁ-
cation. This conforms to the observation of Costain and Reiter (2008) and Shimer (2005)
that the MP model with a constant separation rate produces far too little unemployment
volatility.
However, the empirical separation rate is not in fact constant, as it has a standard
deviation of 5.8 percent. The other two versions of the MP model, which allow for ﬂuctuations
in the separation rate, are calibrated to match the standard deviation of the empirical series.
These two speciﬁcations yield signiﬁcantly greater unemployment volatility. The standard
deviation of unemployment in the OJS speciﬁcation, for example, is 5.9 percent, or over
60 percent of its empirical value. Thus, incorporating variability at the separation margin,
under either of the two speciﬁcations, greatly enhances the ability of the MP model to
produce realistic unemployment volatility.
At the same time, all three speciﬁcations of the MP model yield highly unrealistic volatil-
ity of the job ﬁnding rate, with the empirical standard deviation being almost six times the
simulated value in each speciﬁcation. Improving the model’s performance at the separation
margin does not mitigate its problems at the job ﬁnding margin.
With respect to contemporaneous correlations with productivity, all three speciﬁcations
produce strong negative comovement between unemployment and productivity. Similarly, all
three speciﬁcations give rise to strong positive productivity comovement for the job ﬁnding
rate. Actually, the positive correlation in the model is much stronger than the empirical
14Table 2: Second Moment Properties: Benchmark Calibration
Xt ut JFRt SRt UEt EUt vt vt/ut
(a) Data
σX 0.096 0.077 0.058 0.042 0.052 0.126 0.218
cor(pt,Xt) −0.460 0.369 −0.535 −0.337 −0.521 0.564 0.527
cov(pt,Xt)/σp −5.914 3.786 −4.157 −1.879 −3.644 9.524 15.437
cor(Xt,Xt−1) 0.926 0.804 0.631 0.416 0.560 0.920 0.930
(b) Constant separation
σX 0.011 0.013 − 0.006 0.001 0.034 0.043
cor(pt,Xt) −0.884 0.996 − 0.572 0.860 0.988 0.999
cov(pt,Xt)/σp −0.720 0.959 − 0.258 0.041 2.486 3.205
cor(Xt,Xt−1) 0.859 0.764 − 0.386 0.859 0.701 0.764
(c) Endogenous separation without OJS
σX 0.056 0.013 0.057 0.044 0.054 0.021 0.042
cor(pt,Xt) −0.925 0.994 −0.908 −0.865 −0.897 −0.437 0.998
cov(pt,Xt)/σp −4.116 1.004 −4.110 −3.041 −3.876 −0.757 3.358
cor(Xt,Xt−1) 0.826 0.764 0.608 0.825 0.585 0.648 0.764
(d) Endogenous separation with OJS
σX 0.059 0.014 0.058 0.047 0.054 0.042 0.096
cor(pt,Xt) −0.886 0.995 −0.904 −0.797 −0.899 0.969 0.998
cov(pt,Xt)/σp −3.936 1.020 −3.944 −2.839 −3.704 3.063 7.180
cor(Xt,Xt−1) 0.847 0.764 0.700 0.846 0.682 0.674 0.764
Notes. σX: standard deviation of the variable X; cor(pt,Xt): correlation between labor productivity
pt and Xt; cov(pt,Xt)/σp: elasticity of Xt with respect to pt; cor(Xt,Xt−1): correlation between Xt
and Xt−1. Data sources: ut: quarterly average of monthly oﬃcial BLS unemployment rate; transition
rates and worker ﬂows: quarterly average of the monthly series constructed by Fujita and Ramey (2006);
vt: quarterly average of monthly composite Help-Wanted index constructed by Barnichon (2010); pt:
quarterly output per worker constructed by dividing real GDP by CPS employment series; sample period:
1976Q1-2005Q4. All series are logged and HP ﬁltered, with smoothing parameter 1,600. See subsection
2.4 for measurement in the model. Simulated data are quarterly averages of weekly series, logged and HP
ﬁltered, with smoothing parameter 1,600. Each replication computes simulated statistics from a sample
of 120 quarterly observations. Reported statistics are averages over 1,000 replications.
value. This is because the model does not adequately replicate the sluggishness of the labor
market, as pointed out by Fujita and Ramey (2007), who introduce a one-time job creation
cost in the version with a constant separation rate to address this problem. The exogenous
separation speciﬁcation fails to replicate the negative correlation between productivity and
the separation rate that is a robust feature of the data. The two endogenous separation
speciﬁcations succeed in capturing this negative correlation.
Elasticities of the variables with respect to productivity are shown in the next row.13
13These productivity elasticities are computed as follows. Let pt denote productivity in quarter t, and let
Xt be any series. Then the productivity elasticity is cov(pt,Xt)/σ(pt).
15The productivity elasticities oﬀer somewhat cleaner measures of comovement, insofar as
they reﬂect the eﬀects of variations in productivity in isolation from other disturbances; see
Mortensen and Nagyp´ al (2007b). The elasticities may also be interpreted as rough measures
of responsiveness to productivity shocks. For unemployment, the empirical productivity
elasticity of −5.9 is roughly eight times greater in magnitude than the elasticities produced
by the exogenous separation version of the model. However, when the separation margin is
endogenized, whether OJS is allowed or not, the elasticity increases considerably to a level
not far from the empirical counterpart.
Findings are similar for the separation rate elasticities, where the exogenous separation
speciﬁcation provides highly unrealistic values, while those of the endogenous separation
speciﬁcations are empirically plausible. Across all three speciﬁcations, however, the produc-
tivity elasticities of the job ﬁnding rate are far too low: the empirical value is 3.8, while the
simulated values are always around 1.
In summary, introducing endogenous determination of the separation rate greatly mag-
niﬁes the degree of unemployment volatility generated by the MP model. Moreover, when
the separation rate is endogenous, the model generates realistic responsiveness of unemploy-
ment and the separation rate to productivity shocks. However, in all three speciﬁcations,
the simulated job ﬁnding rate is deﬁcient in both its volatility and its responsiveness to
productivity.
4.2 Worker Flows
The fourth and ﬁfth columns consider gross ﬂows of workers between unemployment and
employment. As panel (b) of Table 2 indicates, the exogenous separation speciﬁcation pro-
duces almost no volatility in UE and EU ﬂows. This is contrary to the data, where the
standard deviations for both ﬂows are roughly half of the standard deviation of unemploy-
ment. The two speciﬁcations with endogenous separation rates, in contrast, do a good job
of matching the empirical standard deviations of both UE and EU ﬂows. Thus, endogeneity
at the separation margin is crucial for producing realistic variability in worker ﬂows.
In terms of correlation with productivity, the exogenous separation speciﬁcation gives
rise to a counterfactual pattern whereby worker ﬂows exhibit a strong positive correlation
with productivity. This contradicts the substantial negative correlation seen in the data.
In the exogenous separation speciﬁcation, worker ﬂows are driven principally by procyclical
movements in the job ﬁnding rate, allowing little scope for explaining their observed coun-
tercyclical movements. The two endogenous separation speciﬁcations, on the other hand,
produce strong negative correlations between productivity and worker ﬂows.
Results on productivity elasticity indicate that worker ﬂows are almost entirely unrespon-
sive to productivity in the exogenous separation speciﬁcation, whereas they exhibit strong
negative responses in the two endogenous separation speciﬁcations.
Note that the exogenous separation speciﬁcation produces procyclical separation (EU)
ﬂows because employment is procyclical and thus the number of workers who separate is
procyclical. For a symmetric reason, hiring (UE) ﬂows would be countercyclical if the job
ﬁnding rate were to be treated as constant. The countercyclicality of both EU and UE ﬂows
16is a salient feature of the data that indicates the importance of variations in the separation
rate for understanding labor market dynamics, as emphasized by Fujita and Ramey (2006)
and Fujita (2011).
4.3 Vacancies and Market Tightness
Vacancies and market tightness are considered in the last two columns of Table 2. First,
all three speciﬁcations produce insuﬃcient volatility of both vacancies and market tightness,
consistent with the low volatility of the job ﬁnding rate discussed earlier. Observe that mar-
ket tightness is signiﬁcantly more volatile in the OJS version than in the other speciﬁcations,
however. In particular, the standard deviation of market tightness in the OJS speciﬁcation
is more than twice that of the endogenous separation speciﬁcation without OJS, even though
the diﬀerences in the standard deviations of unemployment and vacancies are small. This
comes from the fact that the two variables are strongly positively correlated in the version
without OJS, while they are strongly negatively correlated in the version with OJS, as dis-
cussed below. The latter negative correlation serves to increase the variability of market
tightness.
The exogenous separation model replicates the procyclical movements of vacancies seen
in the data, whereas the endogenous separation model without OJS yields countercyclical
movements. The latter ﬁnding reﬂects conﬂicting eﬀects on the incentive to post vacancies.
Following a negative productivity shock, the returns to forming a new match are relatively
low, reducing vacancy posting incentives. This eﬀect drives vacancies downward in the ex-
ogenous separation version of the model. In the endogenous separation version without OJS,
however, the separation rate rises in response to the productivity shock, pushing up the num-
ber of unemployed workers. This raises the vacancy matching probability and enhances the
incentive to post vacancies. On balance, the latter eﬀect dominates, and vacancies become
negatively correlated with productivity. Since unemployment is also negatively correlated
with productivity, vacancies and unemployment become positively correlated in this version
of the model.
The OJS model, on the other hand, produces a strong positive correlation between vacan-
cies and productivity, despite the fact that the separation rate is determined endogenously.
With OJS, a negative productivity shock induces a fall in the number of employed searchers,
which partially oﬀsets the rise in unemployment. Thus, endogenous separation is consis-
tent with realistic vacancy comovement once OJS is incorporated. Moreover, procyclical
vacancy adjustment leads to negative correlation between vacancies and unemployment.14
Note ﬁnally that all three speciﬁcations yield positive productivity comovement for market
tightness, consistent with the data.
The empirical productivity elasticity of vacancies far exceeds the elasticities obtained
from all three speciﬁcations, in line with the comparison in terms of the standard deviations.
14The mechanism discussed here explains why endogenizing the separation margin without OJS reduces
the volatility of vacancies relative to the exogenous separation speciﬁcation and introducing OJS restores
the level of the volatility.
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For market tightness, however, the OJS version of the model performs noticeably better
than the other two versions, generating productivity elasticity that is roughly one-half of its
empirical value.
In summary, the OJS version of the model performs the best among the versions con-
sidered. It matches all correlation patterns. In particular, the OJS version overcomes the
deﬁciency of the endogenous separation model (without OJS) that vacancies become coun-
tercyclical. Even with OJS, however, the MP model fails to match the volatility of vacancies
and thereby the job ﬁnding rate.
4.4 Cross Correlations
Next, we examine whether the three versions of the MP model can replicate the dynamic
relationship between the key labor market variables. Speciﬁcally, we consider cross corre-
lations between unemployment and vacancies (i.e., the Beveridge curve) and between the
separation rate and the job ﬁnding rate.
Panel (a) of Figure 1 presents the Beveridge correlations, where the current-period un-
employment rate is associated with future and lagged values of vacancies up to four quarters.
First observe that a large value of contemporaneous correlation between unemployment and
vacancies observed in the data is reasonably well matched by the value generated by the
exogenous separation speciﬁcation. The endogenous separation speciﬁcation, in contrast,
produces a highly counterfactual value of 0.75. In this version of the model, a negative pro-
ductivity shock produces a large inﬂow into unemployment, making workers easier to ﬁnd
and raising the incentive to post vacancies. For the OJS model, the unemployment-vacancy
18contemporaneous correlation amounts to −0.79, which is reasonably close to the empirical
value. Here, procyclical movements in the number of employed searchers lead to procyclical
changes in vacancy posting incentives, giving rise to a realistic Beveridge correlation.
With respect to the lead-lag relationship, the observed data suggest some tendency for
vacancies to lead unemployment.15 Qualitatively, this pattern is captured well in the constant
separation rate version and the OJS version of the model. This reﬂects the mechanics of the
model, wherein the search friction produces some lagged response in unemployment after the
response in vacancy posting. In the endogenous separation version without OJS, however,
the feedback from the movement of the separation rate into vacancy posting as discussed
above erases this feature, generating the tendency that unemployment leads vacancies.
Panel (b) presents cross correlations between the two transition rates, where the current-
period job ﬁnding rate is associated with future and lagged values of the separation rate. In
the data, job ﬁnding and separation rates exhibit strong negative correlation contemporane-
ously. The correlations are zero under the assumption of the constant separation rate. The
two endogenous separation speciﬁcations, on the other hand, produce strong negative con-
temporaneous correlations, on the order of −0.9. The latter speciﬁcations achieve the correct
transition rate comovement chieﬂy because the two rates themselves respond realistically to
the common underlying productivity process.
Turning to the lead-lag relationship, the data imply that the separation rate leads the
job ﬁnding rate, which is indicated by the fact that larger negative correlations are achieved
when lagged values of the separation rate are associated with the current-period job ﬁnding
rate. While the correlations for the two endogenous separation versions exhibit a slight
negative phase shift, they fail to adequately capture the overall dynamic pattern. Of course,
all of these dynamic correlations are zero under the assumption of a constant separation
rate.
5 Alternative Parameterizations
5.1 Robustness of Calibration
This section evaluates the robustness of our results to setting the matching function elasticity
α and the worker bargaining weight π at a lower value of 0.5.16 The model is re-calibrated
to achieve the same moment conditions discussed above.
Calibrated parameter values in the exogenous separation version and the two endoge-
nous separation versions are presented in Table 3. The results are presented in Table 4. The
results are very similar to those under the benchmark calibration. That is, the endogenous
15For this, observe that correlations between lagged values of vacancies and current unemployment tend
to be larger (in absolute value) than those between future values of vacancies and current unemployment.
16As mentioned before, our benchmark calibration of these two parameters is based on Shimer (2005), who
estimates the elasticity with respect to unemployment at 0.72. Mortensen and Nagyp´ al (2007b) estimate
the elasticity parameter at 0.45 using a diﬀerent method. Br¨ ugemann (2008) then reconciles the diﬀerence
between these two estimates and proposes a value between 0.54 and 0.63. Our choice of 0.5 is thus a
conservative value for checking the robustness of our results.
19Table 3: Parameter Values for Alternative Calibration: α = π = 0.5
Parameter Constant
Endogenous Endogenous
without OJS with OJS
b 0.7 0.7 0.7
c 0.17 0.17 0.17
a − − 0.08
A 0.068 0.067 0.071
α 0.5 0.5 0.5
π 0.5 0.5 0.5
xh 1 1.18 1.125
s 0.005 0.0019 0.0038
λ − 0.085 0.085
σx − 0.27 0.326
ρz 0.9895 0.9895 0.9895
σz 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034
β 0.9992 0.9992 0.9992
Notes. See Table 1 for variable deﬁnitions.
separation version without OJS performs much better than the exogenous separation ver-
sion in terms of volatility of the separation rate and unemployment, as well as productivity
correlation of the separation rate; all versions face the same diﬃculty of generating enough
volatility of vacancies and the job ﬁnding rate; and the OJS version remedies the counterfac-
tual behavior of vacancies in the endogenous separation version without OJS and generates
a relatively large volatility of market tightness. Evaluations based on cross correlations also
yield the same conclusions as in the benchmark calibration.
5.2 Eﬀect of Shock Arrival Rate
This section considers the eﬀect of raising the arrival rate λ of the match-speciﬁc productivity
shock in the endogenous separation versions of the model. For this purpose we change only
this parameter while keeping other parameters at their earlier values.17
Recall that in our benchmark calibration, we used the arrival rate parameter to match
the persistence of the separation rate. This moment is useful in identifying the arrival rate
because, in the model, more frequent shock arrival tends to raise the persistence of the
separation rate. To see this point, suppose that the match-speciﬁc productivity shock is
i.i.d. over time. This property implies that the separation rate is calculated simply as the
mass of employment relationships whose new productivity draws come below the threshold
level Rt, and these draws are made every period by every match. On the other hand, when
the match-speciﬁc productivity shock is highly persistent, increases in the separation rate in
17The purpose of this second experiment is to highlight the eﬀect of this parameter change, particularly
on the persistence of the separation rate, rather than to examine the robustness of the results. Therefore,
we did not recalibrate the model in this instance.
20Table 4: Second Moment Properties: Calibration with α = π = 0.5
Xt ut JFRt SRt UEt EUt vt vt/ut
(a) Constant separation
σX 0.019 0.022 − 0.010 0.001 0.029 0.045
cor(pt,Xt) −0.883 0.996 − 0.574 0.859 0.953 0.999
cov(pt,Xt)/σp −1.239 1.655 − 0.448 0.072 2.079 3.319
cor(Xt,Xt−1) 0.859 0.764 − 0.387 0.859 0.630 0.764
(b) Endogenous separation without OJS
σX 0.064 0.023 0.057 0.043 0.054 0.026 0.045
cor(pt,Xt) −0.920 0.992 −0.913 −0.813 −0.901 −0.525 0.997
cov(pt,Xt)/σp −4.799 1.825 −4.250 −2.881 −3.972 −1.131 3.666
cor(Xt,Xt−1) 0.834 0.764 0.608 0.829 0.580 0.702 0.764
(c) Endogenous separation with OJS
σX 0.067 0.024 0.056 0.045 0.052 0.032 0.093
cor(pt,Xt) −0.906 0.995 −0.941 −0.767 −0.934 0.963 0.998
cov(pt,Xt)/σp −4.582 1.844 −3.990 −2.644 −3.718 2.339 7.086
cor(Xt,Xt−1) 0.852 0.764 0.705 0.842 0.683 0.643 0.764
Notes. See notes to Table 2 for details on data construction and simulation. See panel (a) of Table 2 for
empirical moments. Parameter values are presented in Table 3.
the face of a recessionary shock are concentrated in the impact period, and few separations
occur in the following periods, even though underlying aggregate productivity is persistently
low. In other words, once the matches that have become unviable due to the negative shock
are destroyed on impact, only those that experience a switch of productivity can potentially
be destroyed in the ensuing periods. Adjustments in the separation rate are therefore less
persistent.
Tables 5 and 6 present the parameter values and simulation results, respectively when
the arrival rate of the match-speciﬁc productivity shock is raised from 0.085 to 0.125. This
corresponds to changing the mean arrival time of the shock from 3 months to 2 months.
Again, the main results that we have already discussed so far remain the same. The main
diﬀerence can be observed in the persistence of the separation rate, especially in the version
without OJS, in which the ﬁrst order autocorrelation coeﬃcient increases from 0.61 to 0.67.
Accordingly, persistence of EU ﬂows also increases. When OJS is allowed, the eﬀect is
relatively minor. This is because the job ﬁnding rate directly aﬀects the separation rate,
thus reducing the impact of the persistence eﬀect mentioned in the preceding paragraph on
the behavior of the separation rate (see (11) and (15)).
21Table 5: Parameter Values for Alternative Calibration: λ = 0.125
Parameter
Endogenous Endogenous














Notes. See Table 1 for variable deﬁnitions.
Table 6: Second Moment Properties: Calibration with More Frequent Shock Arrival
Xt ut JFRt SRt UEt EUt vt vt/ut
(a) Endogenous separation without OJS
σX 0.058 0.013 0.058 0.046 0.055 0.025 0.042
cor(pt,Xt) −0.900 0.993 −0.921 −0.827 −0.914 −0.376 0.997
cov(pt,Xt)/σp −4.187 1.011 −4.318 −3.093 −4.071 −0.803 3.383
cor(Xt,Xt−1) 0.841 0.764 0.670 0.842 0.650 0.688 0.764
(b) Endogenous separation with OJS
σX 0.058 0.014 0.056 0.046 0.053 0.044 0.096
cor(pt,Xt) −0.867 0.995 −0.889 −0.764 −0.885 0.974 0.997
cov(pt,Xt)/σp −3.752 1.016 −3.750 −2.659 −3.522 3.197 7.134
cor(Xt,Xt−1) 0.849 0.764 0.715 0.847 0.698 0.679 0.764
Notes. See notes to Table 2 for details on data construction and simulation. Parameter values are
presented in Table 5
6 Hagedorn-Manovskii Calibration
Lastly, we consider the implications of the calibration strategy proposed by Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008, henceforth HM) within our setup. This approach is a natural choice given
our ﬁnding so far that insuﬃcient volatility of the job ﬁnding rate remains a weakness of the
model regardless of how the separation margin is modeled. For brevity, only the constant
and OJS speciﬁcations are considered. We ask whether the HM calibration can raise the
22volatility of the variables of interest without adversely inﬂuencing other desirable features of
the OJS version of the model.
6.1 Calibration Strategy
HM propose an approach to calibrating the MP model that draws on wage and proﬁt data.
In all three speciﬁcations, the wage rate determined by Nash bargaining may be expressed
as:
wt(x) = (1 − π)b + π(ztx + θtc),
where x is identically equal to xh in the exogenous separation speciﬁcation. HM point out
that under standard calibrations, the empirical productivity elasticity of wages is much lower
than the elasticity generated by the model. They propose an alternative calibration strategy
that aims to match this elasticity, along with the empirical relationship between mean wage
and proﬁt levels.
To assess the implications of the HM calibration, this paper follows Hornstein et al. (2005)
in varying the calibrated values of b and π in order to match the productivity elasticity of
wages and the steady-state wage-productivity ratio to the values 0.5 and 0.97, respectively.
The new calibrations are reported in Table 7. As noted by Hornstein et al. (2005), match-
ing the empirical statistics requires large increases in the b parameter and large decreases in
the π parameter. For the exogenous separation speciﬁcation, the A parameter is adjusted to
match the mean job ﬁnding rate, while for the OJS model the parameters xh, s and σx are
also adjusted to normalize mean productivity and match the mean and standard deviation of
the separation rate. We ﬁx the shock arrival rate at 0.085 as in the benchmark calibration.
Importantly, under the HM calibration the volume of job-to-job transitions is essentially
zero, even when the search cost parameter a is set to zero; we cannot match the evidence
from Moscarini and Thompson (2007) used in the other calibrations. The model is solved
and simulated according to the procedures discussed earlier.
6.2 Results
Results are presented in Table 8. One can immediately see that the HM calibration produces
much more realistic volatility of unemployment and the job ﬁnding rate for both the constant
and OJS speciﬁcations. Moreover, the job ﬁnding rate becomes highly responsive to pro-
ductivity. The responsiveness of the separation rate in the OJS model declines considerably,
however. This reﬂects the fact that, following a negative productivity shock, strong down-
ward movement in the job ﬁnding rate reduces separation incentives by worsening workers’
outside option.
The HM calibration enhances the volatility of UE ﬂows in the constant separation rate
model, but it does not appreciably raise the volatility of EU ﬂows, nor does it mitigate the
counterfactual procyclicality of worker ﬂows implied by this speciﬁcation. In the OJS version
of the model, worker ﬂows become less responsive to productivity. For UE ﬂows, in particular,
strong procyclical movements in the job ﬁnding rate serve to neutralize the countercyclical

















Notes. See Table 1 for variable deﬁnitions.
movements in the separation rate, leaving only small responsiveness to productivity. Recall
that in the other calibrations, the OJS version successfully matches the countercyclicality
of worker ﬂows (see the discussion in subsection 4.2). However, this feature of the model is
lost in the HM calibration. The HM calibration greatly improves the performance of both
speciﬁcations in matching the empirical features of vacancies and market tightness. Finally,
the Beveridge and transition rate correlations are essentially unaﬀected for the version with
a constant separation rate, while they become somewhat smaller in magnitude for the OJS
version.18 Although ﬂuctuations in the number of employed searchers play virtually no role
in this case, the correct Beveridge correlation emerges because vacancies become much more
responsive to productivity ﬂuctuations.
6.3 HM Calibration and Incentives for OJS
Incentives for OJS are linked to the size of the worker’s bargaining weight. Using (8) and
(9), the net gain in match surplus from searching on the job versus not searching may be
expressed as:







St+1(y)dG(y) + (1 − λ)St+1(x)
#
.
18Cross correlations for the HM calibration are similar to those shown in Figure 1; a corresponding ﬁgure
for the HM case is available upon request.
24Table 8: Second Moment Properties: Hagedorn-Manovskii Calibration
X ut JFRt SRt UEt EUt vt vt/ut
(a) Data
σX 0.096 0.077 0.058 0.042 0.052 0.126 0.218
cor(pt,Xt) −0.460 0.369 −0.535 −0.337 −0.521 0.564 0.527
cov(pt,Xt)/σp −5.914 3.786 −4.157 −1.879 −3.644 9.524 15.437
cor(Xt,Xt−1) 0.926 0.804 0.631 0.416 0.560 0.920 0.930
(b) Constant separation
σX 0.042 0.051 − 0.024 0.003 0.133 0.168
cor(pt,Xt) −0.870 0.980 − 0.564 0.834 0.969 0.983
cov(pt,Xt)/σp −2.721 3.665 − 1.015 0.160 9.508 12.227
cor(Xt,Xt−1) 0.860 0.761 − 0.394 0.859 0.698 0.761
(c) Endogenous separation with OJS
σX 0.076 0.048 0.058 0.049 0.054 0.111 0.159
cor(pt,Xt) −0.719 0.969 −0.361 0.084 −0.206 0.935 0.972
cov(pt,Xt)/σp −3.919 3.535 −1.755 −0.274 −1.500 7.912 11.812
cor(Xt,Xt−1) 0.827 0.762 0.419 0.601 0.408 0.666 0.762
Notes. See notes to Table 2 for data construction and simulation. Parameter values are presented in
Table 7.
Observe that the beneﬁt of OJS derives from the prospect of starting a new match at the
highest level of surplus, St+1(xh). The current worker-ﬁrm match obtains only proportion π
of this surplus, however. Thus, at very low values of π, such as that associated with the HM
calibration, worker-ﬁrm matches receive a very small share of the surplus from new matches,
so incentives for OJS are low.
7 Conclusion
This paper considers three speciﬁcations of the standard MP model that diﬀer in how they
treat the separation margin. The speciﬁcations are calibrated at weekly frequency and solved
using a nonlinear method. Allowing for endogenous determination of the separation rate
greatly increases the volatility of unemployment in the simulated data. In the speciﬁcation
with OJS, for example, the standard deviation of unemployment equals 60 percent of its
empirical value. Thus, moving beyond the assumption of a constant separation rate goes a
long way toward redressing the problem of insuﬃcient unemployment volatility in the MP
model.
The speciﬁcation with a constant separation rate fails to reproduce the empirical volatil-
ity and productivity responsiveness of the separation rate and worker ﬂows. The endoge-
nous separation speciﬁcations, in contrast, yield empirically reasonable behavior along these
dimensions, and the speciﬁcation with OJS also generates a realistic Beveridge curve corre-
25lation. Furthermore, the endogenous separation speciﬁcations imply more realistic dynamic
interrelationships in comparison to the speciﬁcation with a constant separation rate.
Two broad conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, the endogenous separation
speciﬁcation with OJS dominates the speciﬁcation with a constant separation rate along all
dimensions considered. From the empirical standpoint, there seems to be no justiﬁcation for
assuming a constant separation rate when modeling the separation margin.
Second, the OJS version of the MP model, as articulated in Pissarides (2000), does a re-
markable job of matching labor market facts even under the standard calibration, although
the model still generates insuﬃcient volatility of the job ﬁnding rate and related variables.
Adopting the HM calibration largely resolves the latter failings with some costs. In partic-
ular, the HM calibration implies virtually no job-to-job transitions in the OJS speciﬁcation.
It also makes the cyclicality of worker ﬂows counterfactual. Exploring possible remedies for
these issues appears to be an important topic for future research.
Lastly, the inability of the MP model to generate sluggish dynamics suggests that it does
not deal adequately with key structural features of the labor market. Fujita and Ramey
(2007) argue that ﬁxed costs of vacancy creation may be salient in practice, and they show
that introducing these costs into the MP model with a constant separation rates leads to
substantial improvements in its dynamic performance. Further investigation in this direction
might be useful for deepening our understanding of labor market dynamics.
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